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Abstrak
Rules of origin that indirectly serve as trade barriers, thus raising the potential for increased production 
costs. In agricultural commodities, the rules of origin are primarily determined by wholly-obtained,  so the 
potential for more significant increases in the cost of agricultural products versus other commodities. The 
purpose of this paper is to compare the restrictiveness index rules of origin in ASEAN + 1 FTAs (ACFTA, 
AJCEP, and AKFTA) on agricultural commodities. This study uses the Regime Wide Harris Index by 
Kelleher to calculate the restrictiveness level rules of origin in ASEAN + 1 FTAs. Based on product-specific 
regulations, AJCEP has the most flexible rules of origin, followed by AKFTA and ACFTA as the most 
restrictive of origin in ASEAN + 1 FTAs. In the Regime Wide Harris Index, the results show that AJCEP 
has a flexible origin rule after AKFTA, and ACFTA is the most strict rules of origin in ASEAN + 1 FTAs. 
These results are influenced by the most substantial diagonal side cumulation in the ACFTA.
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Abstrak 
Rules of origin yang secara tidak langsung berperan sebagai hambatan perdagangan sehingga menimbulkan 
potensi peningkatan biaya produksi. Pada komoditas pertanian, rules of origin yang ditetapkan sebagian 
besar wholly obtained sehingga potensi peningkatan biaya lebih besar pada komoditas pertanian 
dibandingkan komoditas lain. Tujuan dari makalah ini adalah membandingkan indeks hambatan rules 
of origin di ASEAN+1 FTAs (ACFTA, AJCEP dan AKFTA) pada komoditas pertanian. Penelitian ini 
menggunakan Regime Wide Indeks Harris oleh Kelleher untuk menghitung tingkat hambatan rules of 
origin pada ASEAN+1 FTAs. Berdasarkan Product Specific Rules, AJCEP memiliki rules of origin paling 
fleksibel, diikuti dengan AKFTA dan ACFTA sebagai aturan asal yang paling ketat di ASEAN+1 FTAs. 
Pada Regime Wide Harris Index didapatkan hasil bahwa AJCEP memiliki aturan asal yang fleksibel 
setelah AKFTA, dan ACFTA merupakan rules of origin yang paling ketat di ASEAN+1 FTAs. Hasil ini 
dipengaruhi oleh sisi diagonal cummulation yang paling besar di ACFTA.
Kata Kunci: rules of origin, komoditas pertanian, ASEAN+1, indeks hambatan
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Introduction
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has increased since the form of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) replaces the role of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1995. The concept of economic integration that leads to free trade agreements characterized 
by the emergence of various massive forms of multilateral, regional and bilateral. As of 15 
June 2014, there are 379 regional agreements according to WTO. The formation of North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), European Union (EU), Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) are the examples of the 
establishment of the RTA because nations want consolidation to protect themselves. ASEAN, 
which initially conducted FTA limited to AFTA, began to develop into ASEAN + 1 (Japan, 
South Korea, and China) which is the country’s biggest trading partner of The Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The large number of FTAs  from these proliferations gives rise to the term “noodle bowl 
problem.” Each FTA has its own rules, details, and interests within a region, which a country 
may engage in more than one FTA. It is not uncommon; then an item is produced with 
materials originating from two or more countries or even countries that originate outside the 
FTA concerned. So it becomes difficult to determine the “origin” of a good (Harris, 2007). 
Automotive may manufacture and assemble in a country, but some parts may be taken and 
manufactured in other countries. At the same time, the determination of tariffs on imported 
goods increasingly decentralized due to the current process of production and international 
trade that rates different tariffs on goods produced in different countries. The rules of origin 
come as a set of rules that determine the origin of products.
Rules of Origin (RoO) defined as the number of criteria used to determine the country 
or region of origin of a good or service in international trade agreement (Harris, 2007). Rules 
of origin are used to prevent the occurrence of trade deflections to avoid tariff payments to 
countries with lower tar iffs and by importing countries doing little value added or added 
value, or even none at all, which is then traded by saying as a local product of the country 
importer. In free trade agreements, RoO prevents imports from non-member countries from 
entering free trade areas through countries (trade deflection). For example three countries - 
the EU, Morocco, and Poland, where the EU and Morocco have signed a bilateral free trade 
agreement. RoO is needed to prevent a trade deflection, to ensure export goods to Morocco 
via the EU. RoO determination of final goods being more complicated if intermediate goods 
require products from other countries to become finished goods rather than before. Therefore, 
when Morocco imports intermediaries from Poland which then used in the production of 
final goods exported to the EU, RoO is then asked to determine whether an end product 
is considered to be initially from Morocco or not. Usually, there are three criteria are used 
in determining the origin status of a product, such as: first, whether the transformation of 
a finished good, included in a different tariff classification line or can be called a Change 
Tariff Classification. Second, whether the value of imports or goods semi-finished exceeds 
a certain percentage  (mostly 40%) of the total finished products or can be called RVC 
(Regional Value Contain). Third, whether a particular production process requires a specific 
process of production or not. RoO determines which of these combinations applied to each 
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product (Augier et al. 2005). All ASEAN + 1 FTAs   -such as: ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Agreement (ACFTA), ASEAN-Kore Free Trade Agreement  (AKFTA), and ASEAN-Japan 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP)- adopt a 40% general rule of local material 
(RVC), with full accumulation. The FTA also provides alternative rules by using CTC for 
a particular product. For AJCEP, the general rule is CTC, with the adoption of RVC more 
considered an optional standard. This AJCEP rule reflects a more liberal RoO tendency for 
Japan when compared to the relatively complex RoO (example JSEPA) (Medalla 2009).
For agricultural and food products in ASEAN + 1 FTA, most of them use the wholly 
obtained regulations and Regional Value Content (RVC), also referred to as regional value-
added needs, in general by 40%. AKFTA is the most liberal for the food and agriculture 
sector since 23 of HS in these agricultural commodities mostly use RVC rules instead of 
WO rules. It is contrasted with ACFTA that uses almost entirely RVC (40) and AJCEP 
regulations that mostly use tariff classification  (CTC) changes in agricultural and food 
products (Medalla 2009).
RoO determination on products that have many components to finished goods, 
more difficult when compared with agricultural products. Most agricultural products, have 
RoO rules that fully produced, planted or raised in the country or commonly referred to as 
wholly obtained rules. However, the RoO rules are so necessitating; it makes the potential 
in production costs to increase (Anson et al. 2005). Not all factors of production can be 
obtained in a country, especially when it comes to the costs incurred to acquire these factors 
of production. So the strict determination of RoO for agricultural products, more likely 
to increase production costs when compared with other types of products. Indonesia’s 
comparative advantage in the agricultural sector, make the work of Roo backfired. RoO 
that can be indirectly referred as protection will be delayed and may reduce the benefits that 
Indonesia may receive from the agricultural sector (Bourdon 2016).
Estevadeordal (2000) who first developed the basic framework of coding for Product 
specific rules by comparison. Product specific rules in the form of rules hen changed in ordinal 
index restrictions for more straightforward analysis. Estevadeordal (2000) used this approach 
to applied in the study of the NAFTA agreement between the US, Canada, and Mexico. 
Then some writings implement the method of Estevadeordal to the analysis of descriptive 
contracts, among others Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006), Sanguinetti (2006), Cadot, 
Estevadeordal, and Suwa-Eisenman (2006), and Suominen (2004). Cadot et al. (2005) used 
the methodology as used by Estevadeordal (2000) but with similar modifications, but not as 
widely described previously. The use of ordinal index by Estevadeordal (2000), then developed 
by Productivity Commission (2004), Anson et al. (2005), Harris (2007) and Kelleher (2011). 
Most existing studies are dealing with the impact of rules of origin on trade. In this 
paper, we are interested in comparing and analyzing the restrictiveness level rules of origin in 
ASEAN+1 FTAs to find out how much impact the regulation can have on trade. Few studies 
are providing the assessment of the restrictiveness index rules of origin in ASEAN+1, and 
among them very little differentiate trade in an agricultural commodity. To our knowledge, 
there is no existing study analyzing the role of rules of origin which focuses on agricultural 
commodities in Indonesia.
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 Method
The analysis in this research was conducted by Kelleher (2012) method with the 
ordinal index for product-specific rules by Harris (2007), to determine the level of restrictive 
of a RoO applied by free trade agreement ASEAN + 1 on agricultural commodities. To 
examine the effect of RoO, an index used which aims to capture the restrictions caused by 
the RoO of each ASEAN + 1 agreement. Agreements analyzed in this study include ACFTA, 
AKFTA, and AJCEP due to data limitations. The difficulties faced by measuring the level 
of RoO restrictions in a regional trade that in reality, this rule more or less expressed in 
the form of complex legal texts. Thus, to give statistical significance to this rule, they must 
first be codified. Then the ordinal restriction index must be defined, which summarizes all 
information as a first step.
Table 1. Restrictiveness Points
Change of classification points
Change Item +2
Change Subheading +4
Change Heading +6
Change Chapter +8
Change Subheading/Change Heading w/AI +2
Exception Points
Ex Item +4
>ex Item and ≤ ex Subheading +5
>ex Subheading and ≤ex Heading +6
>ex Heading and ≤ex Chapter +7
>exChapter +8
Addition Points
Add Item -5
>add Item and ≤add Subheading -6
>add Subheading and ≤add Heading -7
>add Heading and <add Chapter -8
add without CC
 
 +8
Value Test Point
>0% and ≤40% +5
>40% and ≤50% +6
>50% and ≤60% +7
Source: Harris (2007)
Such an approach has introduced by Estevadeordal (2000) proposing synthetic 
indexes at the tariff line level, ranging from one (least restrictive) to seven (strictest), based on 
observational rules that summarize RoO Estevadeordal (2000) on NAFTA (Bourdon 2016). 
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This categorization adopts the method, or test, of the ROO examined by the World Customs 
Organization (WCO), and regulations that have evolved to support the application of such 
tests. This index continuously developed by Australia’s Productivity Commission (2004), 
Anson et al. (2005), and Harris (2007). Most agricultural, plant or animal products, examined 
further in this paper, are subject to Wholly Obtained (WO) regulations or as a whole produced 
by a particular country. Finally, the technical requirements (TECH) became the foundation 
for further regulations on ROO (Chase 2007). Harris (2007) uses a point system for different 
regulatory forms that allow mapping to be an ordinal indicator of restrictions. These points 
added or subtracted based on the elements used in the rule definition. Giving points are 
summarized as follows in Table 1 (Harris 2007).
The method developed by Harris (2007) focuses more on product-specific rules and 
excludes information on the broader terms of the agreement. Kelleher (2012) weighted 
the Harris index (2007) with more broad terms in the regime wide accumulation zone, de 
minimis and certificate of origin. Larger cumulation zones have higher likelihood to produce 
more efficient input producers and have an impact on production decisions by limiting 
permissible access to low-cost inputs from third countries. Thus, the primary determinant 
of the RoO restriction index is the possibility that producers can produce a product with 
low input costs from large accumulation zones. De minimis involves relief on the change of 
tariff classification or technical criteria by facilitating a product manufactured with input not 
derived from a member of an FTA. Usually, the de minimis level on agricultural products is 
less when compared to the overall de minimis level. In the Certificate of Origin, the more 
administrative stages necessary to confirm the status of origin, the higher the cost of RoO and 
the lower the incentive to apply preferential treatment.
RoOit is the RoO Index of country i in year t, RoO PSRO is the ordinal product 
specific rules of RoO ASEAN + 1 by Harris (2007), GDPit Country is the real GDP of 
country i in year t, GDPt Cumulation zone is the real GDP of member countries agreement 
in a free trade agreement in year t, De minimis represents the maximum level of material not 
originating from country i permitted before the last item of origin status in year t, Certit shall 
be assigned a value of 1 if country i applies certificate of origin to all goods originating from 
his country and a value of 0 if not.
Result and Discussion
The RoO combination on each FTA provides a challenge for the most rigorous 
comparison of RoOs, plus the FTAs that are in the same region as the ASEAN + 1 FTA. 
This paper attempts to draw comparisons through the Harris (2007) categorical index based 
on product-specific rules of a particular RoO type. Assessment of index points is expected 
to illustrate, as an indicator of how much it demands a RoO for exporters (Estevadeordal, 
2000). The observation rules based on the following assumptions: first, Changes at the 
chapter level are more restrictive when compared to changes in the heading level, subheading 
so on; second, RVC and TECH attached to product specific rules details will increase ROO 
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restrictiveness level. The complete coding is presented in the appendix and briefly shown in 
Table 2.
The type of ROO used in ASEAN + 1 FTAs  on agricultural commodities uses CTC 
and WO regulations. This fact illustrated that agricultural commodities themselves are fully 
grown and harvested in certain countries before being processed further (Wholly Obtained). 
In contrast to other commodities that require other inputs that may not come from a particular 
country within the same FTA. The CTC rule requires that any material not derived from a 
country, used in the production of goods shall comply with the requirements of the product. 
AJCEP mostly uses CC and CC except for rules when compared to ACFTA and AKFTA. 
This shows that AJCEP is more flexible regarding production requirements to meet RoO 
than ACFTA and AKFTA. Some AJCEP products that use CC rules include HS 01 Live 
animals; HS 03 Fish Crustaceans and HS 05 Products of animal origin. HS 09 Coffee, tea, 
mate & spices added RVC rules (40), which is the percentage of content needed to qualify 
origin by 40 percent of total content.
Table 2. RoO Frequency for Agricultural Sector
ROO Type AKFTA ACFTA AJCEP
WO 136
WO from any ASEAN+1 FTA party or RVC (45) 2
CC 1 252
CC except from chapter 1 84
CTH 2
CTSH 9 4
RVC(40) 12 226 2
CTH +  RVC 183
CC or RVC(40) 5
Total agricultural commodity 342 342 342
Source: Author’s Calculation
ACFTA is the most widely used RVC rule (40). There are two methods for calculating 
RVC (40), the transaction value method and the net cost method. The transaction value 
method estimates the value of the non-heated material as a percentage of the transaction value. 
The net cost method calculates the regional value content as part of the net cost incurred by 
the manufacturer minus costs for sales promotion, royalties, shipping, and packing. Content 
percentage of 40 percent means to meet the content to be able to qualify origin required by 
40 percent of the total existing content.
AKFTA has the most excellent variety of regulations when compared to AJCEP 
and ACFTA. AKFTA most use the rules of CTH + RVC and WO. WO as described, that 
production must raise, planted, produced entirely in a particular country to obtain the status 
of origin. Commodities in AKFTA using WO rules include HS 07 Edible Vegetables; HS 08 
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Edible fruits & nuts, peel of citrus; and HS 10 Bowls of cereal. CTH + RVC provides the 
greatest regulatory loosely, as it uses the rate change rules at Headings level with additional 
content from outside the FTA to be able to fulfill the origin status.
Based on the RoO Index analysis in Table 3, at a glance with some exceptions, the 
RoO restriction level on each FTA has almost similar index values, and the overall index 
of limitations for the agricultural sector is higher than the overall restriction. This is due to 
the cumulation zone agreement is quite large from the member countries of the agreement 
which is a big country (Japan, South Korea, and China). These big countries tend to 
protect their domestic products more stringently when compared to developing countries 
(Bourdon, 2016). So the level of restriction becomes greater when compared with other 
products. Table 3 shows that ACFTA has the highest level of RoO restriction when 
compared to other agreements, followed by AKFTA and AJCEP. The results in the table 
are by the hypothesis stated earlier that earlier agreements have higher levels of restriction 
when compared to more recent agreements (ACFTA effectively implemented in 2004, 
AKFTA in 2007 and AJCEP in 2008 ).
Since China decided to join the WTO and do ACFTA agreement, trade between 
China and ASEAN increased rapidly. China’s domestic market is becoming increasingly 
important on agricultural exports in ASEAN by occupying the third position for export 
markets for agricultural products. The integration of both economies also provides 
opportunities for other agricultural exporting countries to increase their exports to China 
and ASEAN. ACFTA will enhance the competitiveness of its member countries in many 
commodities. Agriculture alone is an important industry in China that employs over 300 
million farmers, which feeds 20 percent of the world’s total population despite only 9 
percent of the world’s fertile land (Carter, 2011). China produces 18 percent of the world’s 
cereal grains, 29 percent of the world’s meat, and 50 percent of the world’s vegetables. The 
success of China which is the world’s largest agricultural producer as a global producer of 
pork, wheat, rice, tea, cotton, and fish. The value of China’s agricultural output is twice the 
total value of US output (Carter, 2011).
Through the Early Harvest Program (EHP) in 2004, ACFTA has reduced tariffs for 
products from HS 01-08 with a maximum tariff rate of 10 percent covering agricultural 
products, among others, live animals, meat and edible meat offal, fish, dairy products, live 
trees, vegetables and edible fruits and nuts. The EHP applies to agricultural products, with 
applicable rules of origin rule of wholly obtained and local content of 40 percent (Tambunan, 
2007). This regulation provides an overview of the large level of RoO restrictions, as it requires 
that good is fully produced in that country or meet a minimum of 40 percent regional 
added value originating from the country concerned. This strict enforcement of RoO must 
meet so that agricultural commodities within the scope of EHP get the tariff preferences 
set. The EHP and RoO programs are quite strictly indirectly used to protect countries with 
comparative advantages in agriculture, in this case, China, and Indonesia. RoO on HS04 
in dairy products strictly applied to ACFTA, given that China is sensitive enough for dairy 
products. China in 2008 had experienced melanin contaminated milk scandal plus in 2010 
there was a case of the presence of a chemical in the dairy products in China. China’s desire 
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to strengthen the rules for dairy products requires that dairy products come from certain 
technical originated countries with a certificate of analysis from China itself.
Table 3 Estimation result of Regime Wide Harris Index ASEAN+1 FTAs  
on agricultural commodities HS 01-14 year 2006-2015
Negara
Tahun
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A
JC
EP
Malaysia 0 0 0 8,6 8,6 8,6 8,6 8,3 8,5 8,6
Singapore 0 0 0 8,6 8,5 8,6 8,5 8,6 8,7 8,7
Thailand 0 0 0 8,5 8,7 8,5 8,3 8,5 8,5 8,6
Filipina 0 0 0 8,6 8,6 8,6 8,8 8,6 8,7 8,7
Brunei 0 0 0 8,9 8,9 8,9 8,4 8,9 9,0 8,9
Jepang 0 0 0 8,9 8,6 8,9 8,6 8,9 9,0 9,0
A
K
FT
A
Malaysia 0 0 9,6 9,9 9,8 7,54 9,7 9,7 9,7 9,7
Singapore 0 0 10,0 9,9 9,4 9,5 9,4 9,6 9,8 10,0
Thailand 0 0 0 0 9,90 9,9 9,0 9,9 9,9 10,0
Filipina 0 0 10,2 10,0 10,2 10,2 10,1 10,0 10,0 10,4
Brunei 0 0 10,2 10,2 10,0 10,0 10,2 10,8 10,9 10,9
South Korea 0 0 9,1 9,1 9,1 9,7 9,9 9,8 9,6 9,2
A
C
FT
A
Malaysia 12,7 12,7 12,6 12,7 12,1 12,1 12,1 12,7 12,7 12,3
Singapore 12,5 12,7 12,7 12,7 12,3 12,3 12,1 12,7 12,3 12,7
Thailand 12,9 12,5 12,6 12,6 12,1 12,2 12,6 12,9 12,6 12,9
Filipina 12,7 12,7 12,7 12,7 12,7 12,6 12,7 12,2 12,7 12,7
Brunei 12.6 12.6 12,8 13,0 13,0 13,4 13,3 13,0 13,0 13,0
China 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,6 11,9 11,7 11,7 11,4 11,5
AKFTA appears to be more liberal when compared to ACFTA, with more significant 
product coverage using changes in tariff classification (Change Tariff Classification). This 
more liberal RoO allows the regulation of tariff changes on an item that may use material 
from another country outside the FTA, from its change from raw goods to finished goods. So 
a product, may not be fully produced by the country concerned but still meet the rules for 
tariff preference, AKFTA also introduces an approach to back-to-back certificate of origin for 
goods through indirect export or in example exports transit at Singapore from other ASEAN 
countries (Manchin and Pelksman-Balaoing 2007). Based on the specific product type, the 
AKFTA is longer in the commodity of HS 03 crab crustaceans, mollusks and other water 
invertebrates, HS 04 Dairy, HS 09 Coffee, tea and spices, HS 11 Industrial milling products, 
HS 13 Lac, gums, resins and saps and other vegetable extracts. By the low import tariffs on 
these sectors, and significant trade barriers including regulatory and sanitary constraints even 
for South Korea itself emphasize agricultural policy, with high food costs for consumers. 
These restrictions make export products from WTO member countries.
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AJCEP RoO general rule is the change of tariff classification (CTC) with the application 
of regional added value (RVC) as an optional rule. This illustrates Japan’s more liberal RoO 
tendency from the previous Japanese FTA. Among other countries in northeastern Asia 
(China, South Korea, and Japan), Japan is the most active country in establishing bilateral 
agreements with ASEAN countries. This dual track approach is an opportunity for a country 
to demand more flexible requirements from Japan than in a group negotiation (AJCEP). 
This makes AJCEP mainly a series of bilateral agreements also between Japan and ASEAN 
members. So RoO rules become uniform per product and produce a more liberal RoO 
(Medalla 2009). In previous Japan Bilateral agreements with ASEAN member countries, 
RoO has been quite strict for specific products because Japan is essentially a country that is 
sensitive to agricultural products. Thailand, as the world’s largest rice exporter, agreed with 
Japan not to include rice from FTA with Japan, while the Philippines continues negotiations 
on the abolition of sugar tariffs. Japanese and Malaysian relations also exclude pineapple and 
dairy products from Malaysia (Heng 2007).
Previous index methodologies have been applied to analyze NAFTA Roo and EU 
agreements (Estevadeoral 2000, Brenton and Manchin 2002, Augier, Lai-Tong and Gasiorek 
2003, Estevadeordal and Suominen 2003). The index developed in their study has focused 
on specific RoO provisions - for example, whether the change in tariff classification (CTC) 
is at a tariff option (HS 8 digits), sub-title (6 digits), toward (4 digits) or chapter (2 digits) 
level. But some research focuses on the impact of RoO but only on its effects on aggregate 
exports and does not focus on a particular sector. Estevadeordal (2000) identified that RoO 
for intermediates is stricter than final goods. and  Anson et al. (2005) conclude that the 
presence of RoO virtually limits the market access that these preferential trading agreements 
(PTAs) confer to the Southern partners.
Conclusion
The result of the analysis of the level of restriction shows the level of RoO ACFTA 
restriction to be the largest in agricultural commodities when compared to other FTAs 
within the scope of ASEAN + 1. However, if viewed per country, the level of restriction in 
ASEAN countries tends to be greater when compared to trading partner countries (Japan, 
South Korea, and China). This is because ASEAN member countries have higher rates and 
higher non-tariff barriers and tariff differences in each of the relatively high ASEAN member 
countries on agricultural commodities. Indonesia as one of the countries that are willing 
to sign FTA should adhere to a more uncomplicated general RoO. Such a level of diagonal 
cumulation can further assist in regional integration and enable ASEAN member countries 
to share production factors so that production costs become cheaper. In the future, this 
cumulation can decrease the tendency of protection and trade diversion caused by RoO. 
Furthermore, there is a need for more comprehensive rules of origin rule. Because 
RoO rules in Indonesia are still understood to be limited to technical regulations. So, that 
Indonesia has the potential to be harmed in trade in agricultural commodities within the 
framework of ASEAN + 1 FTA. Thus, it is necessary to harmonize procedures and trades that 
are no longer in the physical form to reduce administrative costs and documents.
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Appendix
(1) Coding Product Specific Rules of Origin
a. Coding based on legal text AJCEP agreements
Section of HS Position HS6 Coding tipe RoO
I. Live Animals 1 CC (1)
2 CC exept from chapter 1 (1)
3 CC (1)
4 CC (1)
5 CC (1)
II. Vegetables 6 CC (1)
7 CC (1)
8 CC (1)
9 CC (17) RVC (2) CTSH (4)
10 CC (1)
11 CC (8) CC except from chapter (4)
12 CC (1)
13 CC (1)
14 CC(1)
15 CC (1)
b. Coding based on legal text AKFTA agreements
Section of HS Position HS6 Coding tipe RoO
III. Live Animals 1 WO (1)
2 WO (2)
3 WO (38) RVC (2)
4 WO (13) CTSH (2) WO+RVC(2)
5 WO (1)
IV. Vegetables 6 WO (1)
7 WO (1)
8 WO (27)
9 WO (14) RVC (9)
10 WO (1)
11 WO (10) CTH (3) CTSH (9)
12 WO (1)
13 WO (9) RVC (1)
14 WO (1)
15 WO (1)
c. Coding based on legal text ACFTA agreements
Section of HS Posisi HS6 Coding tipe RoO
V. Live Animals 1 CC (1)
2 CC + RVC (2)
3 RVC (7)
4 RVC (19)
5 RVC (1)
VI. Vegetables 6 CC + RVC (1)
7 CC + RVC (1)
8 CC + RVC (1)
9 RVC (23)
10 RVC (14)
11 RVC (22)
12 RVC (57)
13 RVC (34)
14 RVC (48)
15 RVC (1)
Note: The numbers in brackets indicate how many times the rules of origin in the legal text are repeated
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(2) Harris Restrictiveness index  based on agriculture commodity
a. Harris Restrictiveness index  based on AJCEP agriculture commodity
Regulation Agricultural Sector (HS1-14) Restrictiveness Index
CC 252 8
CC except from chapter 1 84 8
RVC (40) 2 5
CTSH 4 4
342 100% 6,2
b. Harris Restrictiveness index  based on AKFTA agriculture commodity
Regulation Agricultural Sector (HS1-14) Restrictiveness Index
WO 136 8
RVC (40) 12 5
WO from any ASEAN+1 FTA Party 
or RVC (45)
2 5
CTH + RVC (40) 183 6+5
CTSH 9 4
342 100% 6,6
c. Harris Restrictiveness index  based on ACFTA agriculture commodity
Regulation Agricultural Sector (HS1-14) Restrictiveness Index
CC 1 8
CC + RVC (40) 5 8+5
RVC (40) 226 5
342 100% 8,6
